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Chapter 2
The Chilean Pension Reform Turns 25:
Lessons from the Social Protection Survey
Alberto Arenas de Mesa, David Bravo, Jere R. Behrman, Olivia S.
Mitchell, and Petra E. Todd, with assistance from Andres Otero,
Jeremy Skog, Javiera Vasquez, and Viviana Velez-Grajales
Global aging trends pose bankruptcy threats to many conventional PAYGO
social security systems around the world. Accordingly, analysts are looking
with keen interest at Chile’s funded individual-account DC pension plan,
a system that was adopted in 1981 and remains in place after twenty-
five years. Numerous other Latin-American countries followed Chile in
embracing funded individual-account pensions, and the Chilean model
has received substantial attention in the USA and other countries as well.1
Commentators have showered the Chilean pension reform with both praise
and criticism, and numerous studies have analyzed dimensions of the
reform, including its impact on the macroeconomy, capital markets, and
aggregate savings.2 Despite the prominence of the Chilean approach to
old-age security and continued debate about the pension system’s impacts,
however, there has been little attention to microeconomic aspects of the
new retirement program. In part, this lack of research is attributable to
the lack of longitudinal microeconomic data with which to conduct such
analyses.
This chapter introduces the Encuesta de Previsión Social (EPS, or Social
Protection Survey), a recently developed longitudinal survey of individual
respondents that provides invaluable new information for microeconomic
analyses of key aspects of the Chilean pension system, and illustrates some
of the analyses possible with these data. Initiated in 2002, the EPS fielded
a follow-up round in 2004; additional survey waves were scheduled for
2006 and every two years thereafter (funding permitting). In addition, the
Lead authors are listed alphabetically. The authors acknowledge research support from NIA
grant AG023774-01; a grant from the Mellon Foundation to the Population Studies Center
on Latin American demographic issues; awards from the Population Aging Research Center
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research team has worked to link respondent records to a wide range of
historical administrative files on contribution patterns, benefit payments,
and other program features. Accordingly, the EPS represents a substantial
advance for analysts interested in important micro questions related to the
operation of the Chilean retirement system. To illustrate some of the rich-
ness of the new information available, this chapter discusses new analyses
regarding three key policy questions:
1. Who participates in the Chilean retirement system, and what do life-
time contribution patterns look like?
2. What have people accumulated in the Chilean retirement system, and
what benefits may be anticipated?
3. How financially knowledgeable are Chileans about their retirement
system?
These three interlinked questions are of interest as they pertain to the cen-
tral purpose of a retirement system: namely, to provide adequate resources
for a secure retirement. The subject of pension coverage and who con-
tributes to their pensions over their work lives is important in the Latin-
American context as well as in many other nations where pension system
nonparticipation is currently a topic of active debate (see, for instance, Gill,
Packard, and Yermo 2005). Whether and how individual workers and their
families participate in the system can only be studied with microdata of the
sort we are developing. Anticipated retirement benefits from the system are
also of key policy interest, as these will vary with lifetime contribution pat-
terns as well as socioeconomic status, retirement ages, and other factors. In
the Chilean context, it is also worth recognizing that the funded individual-
account program is backstopped by safety net components to protect those
who accumulate little in their personal accounts. Improved projections of
future financing burdens will require detailed data on patterns of contribu-
tions and assets accumulated over the lifetime. Finally, learning more about
workers’ financial literacy regarding their pension system is of interest in
the Chilean case, as lack of knowledge may possibly explain participation
and other choices related to the system, as well as whether the system favors
certain types of people over others—for example, those with more rather
than less schooling.
To preview, the results show:
 Over their work lives, men self-report contributing to the pension
system about half the time since aged 18 years, with lower levels for
women. Thus, men in their 40s report contributing for a total of about
14 years since aged 18 years; women, about 10 years.
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 Self-reports of payments into the new pension system indicate higher
contribution levels than do administrative records for the same people
over the same period. For instance, administrative records for men
currently in their 40s indicate about 13 years of contribution since aged
18 years, and for women, about 6 years.
 Spells of noncontribution appear mainly to be periods when people
held no jobs, were unemployed, or were self-employed (self-employed
persons are not required to contribute to the system). In other words,
contribution patterns during periods of work as employees (particu-
larly in wage employment) are very high.
 Account balances reported by respondents who claim to know their
accumulations in the AFPs (Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones,
or pension fund managers) are remarkably similar to those derived
from administrative records, averaging around $3 million Chilean
pesos (∼US$5,600). However, only 40 percent of the respondents are
able to provide an estimated balance—and administrative data for
the entire sample suggests that those who offer estimates have larger
accounts than respondents who cannot estimate their AFP assets.
 Retirement payments for those currently reaching retirement age
also depend on recognition bonds (RBs) from the old PAYGO sys-
tem. Those RBs are worth as much as the AFP system assets for
respondents entitled to them. Accordingly, any analysis of retirement
assets and eventual benefits must recognize both sources of retirement
support.
 Knowledge of the new Chilean pension system is far from perfect. For
instance, most workers cannot accurately report contribution require-
ments under the new system, how much they pay in commissions, what
the rules are for minimum pensions, and how they have their funds
invested. Lack of knowledge is concentrated among those employees
with poorer backgrounds and less education and among women.
 Among retirees, knowledge is more satisfactory. Most people who are
retired according to administrative records also self-report they are
retired (84%). Some two-thirds of the retirees know what kind of pen-
sion they are receiving, and about 64 percent know the benefit amount
(give or take 20%), though they tend to report smaller amounts than
are indicated by the administrative data. In general, people who know
their pension amounts also are those receiving larger benefits than the
median.
Some of these findings appear to be matters of concern to the newly elected
Chilean president, who confirms that pension reform is high on her policy
agenda.
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The Evolution of Chile’s Retirement System3
Chile was among the pioneers of social security in Latin America, establish-
ing its first national social insurance fund in 1924. The subsequent evolu-
tion of Chile’s social security system had three stages. The first, between
1924 and the 1970s, was based on the Bismarckian model of occupation-
ally segmented social insurance schemes. The second, from the 1970s to
1980, reflected the Beveridge plan’s proposal for universal social security
coverage. The hallmark of the third, which began in 1980, was the devel-
opment of a funded system with privately managed individual accounts,
supplemented with a social safety net, described below.
The Chilean Retirement System before 1980
The Chilean old-age system began in the 1920s. By the mid-1950s, three
main pension funds (or cajas) provided benefits for most salaried workers,
and two separate funds covered the police and armed forces. As time
went on, other funds were created and the menu of regimes within the
three main pension programs expanded. At the end of the 1970s, the
retirement system included as many as 150 individual regimes and sub-
stantial institutional fragmentation, with 35 different funds (see Castañeda
1990). Consequently, coverage was stratified, was only moderately pro-
gressive, and threatened the nation with a rising fiscal burden. Several
different governments tried unsuccessfully to reform the structure over
the years, but their attempts were repeatedly blocked by powerful interest
groups (Arellano 1985; Mesa-Lago 1994). Benefit eligibility varied across
sectors and depended on a minimum number of work years in that sec-
tor. Retirement payouts were set according to DC formulas that granted
higher payouts for more years of work and higher pay in that sector. Many
workers were not covered by any retirement plan, and those who were
faced very uncertain benefits due to the increasing insolvencies of the
programs.
Issues Regarding Coverage
The core objective of an old-age system is to ensure an adequate income
for retirees, with most modern systems also providing social insurance for
disabled persons, surviving spouses, and orphans. Effectiveness in fulfilling
these objectives, therefore, relies heavily on the system’s ability to collect
contributions or taxes when individuals are in the economically active pop-
ulation. Accordingly, assessing a pension system’s success is at least partly
measurable by inquiring what percentage of active workers pays into the
program. Table 2-1 summarizes the fraction of the employed population
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Table 2-1 Pension System Contribution Patterns: 1975–80
Year Contributors/Employment Contributors/Labor Force
AFP INP Total AFP INP Total
1975 n/a 71.2% 71.2% n/a 61.9% 61.9%
1980 n/a 53.3% 53.3% n/a 47.8% 47.8%
1985 44.0% 12.8% 56.9% 38.8% 11.3% 50.1%
1990 50.6% 8.1% 58.7% 46.8% 7.5% 54.4%
1995 57.2% 5.5% 62.7% 53.5% 5.1% 58.6%
2000 59.4% 4.2% 63.6% 54.5% 3.9% 58.4%
Source: Derived from Arenas de Mesa, Behrman, and Bravo (2004).
Note: n/a = not applicable.
and the fraction of the labor force that has paid into the retirement system
over time. The table shows that the highest ratio of contributors was seen
in the mid-1970s, with a downward trend thereafter. When the new system
was introduced in 1980, the fraction of workers and the overall labor force
that contributed to the national pension fund (the Instituto de Normal-
ización Provisional, or INP) fell precipitously, while the contribution rate
to the AFP system rose steadily. Other authors report similar patterns over
the period, although levels of coverage differ from one study to the next
(Arellano 1985; Cheyre 1988).
The downward trend in effective coverage that began in the early 1970s
can be accounted for in part by rising unemployment, since jobless workers
have not been expected to pay into the system. But increasing unemploy-
ment was not the only reason, since coverage within occupations (among
workers with jobs) also declined in the mid-1970s, falling from 86 to 71
percent over the period 1975–80 (Cheyre 1988) or from 71 to 53 per-
cent (Arellano 1985). Some experts contend that much of the coverage
declined during the 1970s was attributable to increased evasion (Cheyre
1988). Others emphasize the complex interaction of higher unemploy-
ment, greater incentives for evasion, and more precarious labor relations
(Marcel and Arenas de Mesa 1992).
Financing the Old PAYGO System
Another measure of a retirement system’s effectiveness has to do with its
ability to provide benefits to those eligible to receive benefits. In Chile, the
number of retirees and others eligible to receive benefits climbed from
approximately 500,000 people in the late 1960s to more than 1 million
people by the end of the 1970s, for an average annual growth rate during
that decade of 5.7 percent (Arenas de Mesa 2000).
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Before 1980, the system was for all intents and purposes a PAYGO sys-
tem; returns on the few invested assets amounted to only 2.5 percent
of the system’s total annual revenues. As a result, the system’s financial
equilibrium depended on economic growth, since in a PAYGO program,
economic growth, along with trends in the ratio of contributing members
to noncontributing members, determines wage levels and hence revenues
from contributions.
Assuming constant conditions in terms of replacement ratios and contri-
bution rates, the contribution ratio is in turn determined by demographic
factors such as the age composition of the population, economic factors
such as unemployment, the relative size of the informal sector in the
economy, evasion rates, regulatory and policy-related factors such as the
established retirement age, and pension eligibility requirements for early
retirement. In Chile, the ratio of contributing to noncontributing mem-
bers had trended downward between 1965 and 1980, falling from 3.6 to
2 contributing members for every pensioner. At the time of the reform,
government revenues averaging 2 percent of GDP per annum had already
been required to finance the system (see Table 2-2). Further, it seemed
clear that maintaining pension promises would have required further infu-
sion of large amounts of government revenues to the old-age system.
The 1980 Chilean Pension Reform
Thus, Chile’s pension system, like those of many other Latin-American
countries that undertook reforms later, was institutionally fragmented,
included a vast number of different regimes, and faced problems regarding
finances, coverage, equity, and administrative efficiency (Arenas de Mesa
2000). Both the Frei and Allende administrations attempted to standardize
Table 2-2 Pre-1980 Old-Age System Revenues and Expenditures: 1974–80
Year Millions of 2003 pesos % of GDP
Revenues Expenditures Deficit Revenues Expenditures Deficit
1974 344,523 698,866 −354,342 3 6.2 −3.1
1975 310,985 422,261 −111,276 3.4 4.6 −1.2
1976 360,509 662,877 −302,369 3.4 6.2 −2.8
1977 454,651 831,933 −377,282 3.6 6.7 −3
1978 556,642 1,027,681 −471,039 3.7 6.8 −3.1
1979 937,063 1,241,874 −304,811 5.2 6.9 −1.7
1980 1,017,362 1,336,172 −31,881 5.5 7.2 −1.7
Sources: Marcel and Arenas de Mesa (1992) and Central Bank of Chile (BCCH).
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the pension regimes and do away with privileges enjoyed by limited groups,
but both failed to achieve the necessary consensus.
Several years after the military government of General Pinochet took
power, it launched a national retirement system reform. The first phase
sought to stabilize the PAYGO system by raising retirement ages, increasing
contribution rates, and eliminating some special schemes. Subsequently,
the government moved in 1980 to reform the system dramatically by closing
the old system to new workers and replacing it with a new system that placed
at center stage a system of funded DC individual accounts. In addition, the
government standardized eligibility and benefit requirements.
While many non-Chileans focus primarily on the individual-account
element of the pension system, it must be recognized that the resulting
structure is a ‘three-pillar public/private’ system, in the terminology of the
World Bank (1994).
The first pillar has three key components:
1. A noncontributory public system provides welfare-based pensions
(pensiones asistenciales, or PASIS) for the indigent. The system is means-
tested and operated centrally for both the determination and payment
of PASIS benefits.
2. A state-guaranteed minimum pension guarantee (MPG) for AFP par-
ticipants who have twenty years of contributions. The purpose of the
MPG—a key element of Chile’s social protection policy—is to ensure
that all eligible participants will receive a basic level of minimum old-
age income. In practice, the federal government makes transfer pay-
ments to the AFP accounts of retirees who have insufficient balances
to pay the minimum pension.
3. The public DC system, the old INP, that administers the old PAYGO
DC program was closed to new entrants by the 1980 reform.4
The second pillar of the Chilean pension system consists of the mandatory
contributory program known as the AFP system. This is a national savings
program aimed at all wage and salary workers, intended to provide partici-
pants with old-age benefits. (It also provides life insurance and disability
benefits as part of the mandatory program.) When the new program was
announced, existing workers were required to decide whether to remain
in the old INP system or to move to the new system. Those who moved to
the new system received credit for INP contributions in the form of the
transferable RB.5 The new AFP system is mandatory for all new wage and
salary workers joining the labor force as of 1981, but affiliation remains
optional for self-employed workers.
Wage workers in the AFP system establish individual pension accounts by
affiliating with one of the privately managed pension funds. By law, workers
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must contribute 10 percent of their monthly earnings, plus an additional
contribution (currently 2–3% of monthly wages) to cover administrative
costs as well as disability and survivor insurance.6 Workers may only partici-
pate in one AFP at any given time, but they may periodically switch between
AFPs with proper notice.7 Initially, all AFP monies were invested in gov-
ernment bonds, though more recently pension fund managers have been
permitted to offer a broader, albeit regulated, array of investment choices.
They also offer a lifecycle investment strategy that automatically moves
assets into more conservative investments as workers age. At retirement,
retirees may use their accumulated funds, including the RBs, to purchase a
lifetime income stream.8
Affiliates who have contributed for at least twenty years but who have
accumulated funds insufficient to reach the MPG level are entitled to
receive a government subsidy financed from general tax revenues.9 Work-
ers cannot receive their pensions until the legal retirement age (currently
age 60 years for women and 65 years for men), but early retirement is
allowed under some conditions.10 Naturally, as with any DC plan, retiree
benefits depend directly on AFP balances at retirement, and hence benefits
are a function of workers’ lifetime earnings, contribution histories, and AFP
investment choices. For this reason, retirees’ benefits depend more closely
on individuals’ risk preferences and behavior, whereas in a DC, or PAYGO,
plan, solvency risks are more prominent.
The third pillar of the Chilean system, like the second, operates on the
basis of individually funded DC accounts. However, in keeping with the
World Bank model that gained in popularity during the 1990s, it is a
voluntary program. Affiliates who wish to pay more than the mandated
pension contribution may do so, and such contributions receive some tax
benefits.
The new AFP system and the old PAYGO system differ in key ways.
Most importantly, workers’ AFP accumulations represent funded, individ-
ually owned accounts, over which affiliates have some investment and
bequest decision-making power. By contrast, the PAYGO structure of the
old Chilean system faced bankruptcy. In moving to the new plan, the hope
was that workers would become more aware of the value of participating
in the system, the size of their own accumulations, the opportunity to
make investment choices, and the options regarding retirement payouts.
Further, under the AFPs, workers would have a chance to save more than
the 10 percent required contribution, which might be attractive to those
who truly value access to funded individual investment-based accounts.
Also, AFP savings and pension payouts are inflation-adjusted, address-
ing a well-known deficiency of the old PAYGO plan.11 Finally, the fact
that AFP affiliates are guaranteed a minimum wage-indexed retirement
benefit—worth twice the welfare benefit—if they pay into the new system
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for twenty years was anticipated to draw more workers into formal sector
jobs.
Transition Issues
More than twenty-five years of experience with the new reform finds the
Chilean transition process in full swing. Both the old and the new systems
continue, with the old one gradually winding down over time and the new
one growing at a steady pace. Contributors to the old system will cease being
active workers in about 2025, and retirement pensions will stop being paid
in approximately 2050.12
It is interesting that the reform was intended to confine the government’s
role to that of pension system regulator, inspector, supervisor, and guaran-
tor of the AFP system. In particular, via the Superintendencia de Admin-
istradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (SAFP, or Superintendency of Pension
Fund Managers), the government is charged with regulating, inspecting,
and supervising the management of the AFP system (SAFP 2002). In addi-
tion, the government plays a significant role in several key areas:
 Administration and payment of benefits under the old INP system;
 Administration, calculation, and payment of RBs for those who trans-
ferred to the AFPs;
 Administration and payment of pension benefits under the public
plans for the armed forces and the police;
 Administration and payment of the MPG under the AFP system; and
 Administration of the PASIS system for indigents and those lacking
pension coverage.
The first two of these governmental duties are time-limited, but the others
are ongoing.
Furthermore, the government serves as the guarantor of last resort in
the event of the bankruptcy or default of any AFP or insurance provider,
as well as by ensuring that the yields for plan members remain above an
established floor rate. Each of these responsibilities imposes an actual and
potential financial burden on government coffers, the amount of which is
an area of continuing research.
Economic Impacts of the Funded Individual Accounts
The accumulating pension funds have played a growing role in the Chilean
economy since 1980. By 2003, the assets had grown to around 60 percent of
GDP (see Table 2-3). The pension funds have acted as an engine of growth
for various sectors of the economy and for the capital and life-insurance
markets, among others. The AFPs, now the largest institutional investors
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Table 2-3 Cumulative Value and Rates of Return on Chilean
Pension Fund Assets: 1981–2003
Year Pension Fund Assets
under Management
Returns on
Fund Assets
Value a % of GDP Average Yearly
Real Return (%)
1981 11,695 0.9 12.8
1982 44,495 3.7 28.5
1983 99,474 6.5 21.3
1984 159,576 8.4 3.6
1985 281,807 10.3 13.4
1986 433,377 12.7 12.3
1987 644,728 14.1 5.4
1988 885,875 14.7 6.5
1989 1,329,268 17.5 6.9
1990 2,244,481 23.3 15.6
1991 3,769,243 29.7 29.7
1992 4,736,462 29.4 3
1993 6,830,788 35.4 16.2
1994 8,983,563 38.8 18.2
1995 10,230,990 36.1 −2.5
1996 11,555,632 37 3.5
1997 13,405,826 38.6 4.7
1998 14,552,547 39.8 −1.1
1999 18,093,003 48.7 16.3
2000 20,343,371 50.1 4.4
2001 22,955,974 52.8 6.7
2002 25,227,058 54.4 3
2003 29,176,611 58.6 10.5
1981–91 — — 14.2
1991–2003 — — 8.7
1981–2003 — — 10.4
Source: Arenas de Mesa (2005).
aMillions of current pesos.
in the financial market, finance five out of nine new mortgages (SAFP
2002).
Over time, the asset mix of these funds has changed considerably, becom-
ing more diversified (see Table 2-4). In 1981, the bulk of these investments
were in financial papers (71.3%) but in 1989, the share of such instru-
ments began to shrink, falling to 26 percent by 2003. Meanwhile, the share
of corporate bonds—that is, bonds issued by nonfinancial institutions—
and equities expanded, rising to 7.7 and 14.5 percent (13.5% in business
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Table 2-4 Distribution of Investment Portfolio: 1981–2003
Year Government Financial
Institutions a
Nonfinancial
Institutions b
Equities c Mutual Funds
and Others d
Foreign
Assets e
Other f
1981 28.1 71.3 0.6 0 0 0 0
1985 42.4 56.0 1.1 0 0 0 0.5
1990 44.1 33.4 11.1 11.3 0 0 0.1
1995 39.4 22.4 5.2 30.1 2.6 0.2 0.1
2000 35.7 35.1 4.0 11.6 2.5 10.8 0.2
2003 24.7 26.3 7.7 14.5 2.9 23.8 0.1
Source: Derived from Arenas de Mesa (2005).
Note: Totals should sum to 100% except for rounding error.
aFinancial sector less the equities of financial institutions.
b Business firms less equities and quotas of investment funds.
c Stocks of financial institutions plus those of the business sector.
d Investment funds of the business firms plus others from the external sector.
e Foreign issuers less others from the external sector.
f Disposable assets.
enterprises and 1% in financial institutions), respectively, by 2003—about
13 percent of GDP. Investment in foreign assets began in 1993, three years
after the law creating this option was passed. In that year, such investments
amounted to 0.6 percent of the funds’ total value; by 2003, their share had
grown to 23.8 percent. These changes in AFP portfolios have been made
possible by the growth of the pension funds, the development of the capital
market, and the relaxing of regulations that place limits on investments
(SAFP 2002).
The Social Protection Survey and Linked
Administrative Data
In 2002, the Micro-data Center of the Department of Economics of the
Universidad de Chile under the directorship of David Bravo conducted a
new household survey, called the Encuesta de Previsión Social (EPS), or
the Social Protection Survey. This survey has been an invaluable research
tool, providing researchers much useful new individual-level information—
information that previously was unavailable—for addressing numerous
research questions, including the main issues of this chapter.13 The inter-
view sample was drawn from a sampling frame of approximately 8.1 mil-
lion current and former affiliates of the Chilean old-age systems compiled
from official databases obtained from the Chilean Ministry of Labor and
Social Security. The frame included about three-quarters of the population
aged 15+ in 2001. The survey, fielded between April and December 2002,
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collected data from individuals who were working, unemployed, out of the
labor force, receiving pensions, or deceased (in which case information was
collected from surviving relatives).
The 2002 EPS survey included sociodemographic information and cur-
rent labor market data for each member of the household, detailed infor-
mation about receipt of pensions and types of pension plan participation,
and retrospective labor market history going back to 1980. Ultimately, the
survey contains data on 17,246 individuals (937 of them were reports by
surviving relatives) affiliated with the old or the new retirement system for
at least 1 month at any time during 1981–2001.14
In 2004 surveyors administered another round of the survey, which
included a second wave for previously surveyed respondents as well as
new surveys for a subsample of individuals not affiliated with the social
security system (individuals never employed in the formal sector) and a
subsample of new entrants into the AFP system between 2002 and 2004. The
survey, in addition, introduced a host of new health and wealth questions.15
Consequently, the 2004 survey is representative of the entire Chilean
population.16 Furthermore, the research project received permission to
merge responses with administrative records on pension contributions and
earnings in the PAYGO and AFP systems since 1980; data on the amounts
of RBs; and monthly data on account changes in the individual investment
accounts, switches between AFPs, AFP commissions charged, and invest-
ment returns earned on all AFP accounts. The survey data has also been
merged with monthly social security records available since 1981.17 In what
follows, we provide details about the specific variables central for each
analysis.
Informing the Policy Debate Using the Social
Protection Survey
As noted, the 2002 and 2004 surveys, linked to administrative records,
provide the essential database for answering the critical micro questions
about the current Chilean pension system posed in the introduction of this
chapter. Next we turn to the evidence.
Contribution Patterns under the Chilean Retirement System
This section characterizes retirement system contributions made by EPS
respondents. The information used to track contributions is derived from
two sources. First, EPS interviewees were asked about their employment
and old-age system work histories and contribution patterns from 1980
onward. Specifically, Module II of the 2002 EPS survey asks, for each job
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held since aged 15 years, whether the respondent contributed to some
retirement system and, if so, which system. Second, it asks respondents to
report earnings, hours of work, labor force status, occupation, and industry
for each job. We use this survey information to derive the respondents’
self-reported months of contribution over time. This information may be
further classified according to each respondent’s labor market status at the
time, which we identify as working, unemployed, or not in the labor force.
To derive the self-reported months of contributions to various retirement
systems, we first turn to the labor history section of the 2002 EPS. Here
we count only months of contributions reported for respondents between
the ages of 18 years and 60 years, inasmuch as there is little formal work
prior to age 18 years, and some individuals, particularly women, retire at
age 60 years.
The results of this tabulation may be seen in Table 2-5. Panel A contains
both self-reports and administrative records on months of contributions
to the AFP system, for those for whom we have both sets of records.18
Panel B indicates total months of contributions to all retirement systems,
including the old INP as well as the AFP programs. In the self-reports
on AFP contributions, men report more months of AFP contributions, on
average, than do women. This finding is not surprising, given that many
Chilean women leave the paid labor force for childrearing. Also clear is the
rising pattern of contributions by age, such that workers in their late 20s
report 64 months of contributions to the AFP system (5.3 years on average)
since 1981, while workers in their 50s report more than double this level
(14.1 years). It is worth recalling that workers older than 39 years in 2002
would have been exposed to the old INP system prior to the 1980 reform
and hence are likely to have had periods of contributions under the old
system as well (more on this below).19 Somewhat surprising is the result
that months of contributions do not vary much by education, at least for
the self-reported tallies.
The second column in Panel A of Table 2-5 indicates mean months of
contributions to the AFP system derived from administrative records over
the same calendar period, while the third column displays the ratio of self-
reported months to administrative data.20 Overall, self-reported contribu-
tion months exceed the administrative data counts by 20 percent, no doubt
in part due to recall error.21 Those in the 30–50 age range seem to be most
optimistic regarding their self-reported months of contribution, with lesser
differences for younger and older individuals. The third column shows
that men are less likely to over-report than women, compared to admin-
istrative records; younger workers less than middle-aged workers; and edu-
cated workers less than the lesser-educated. Figure 2-1 plots the months
of contribution patterns and differences by more detailed age groups,
for the AFP system alone and for (self-reports of) contributions to all
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Table 2-5 Contribution Patterns to the Chilean Retirement System by Sex, Age, and
Education: Number of Months Contributed by EPS 2002 Respondents
Mean Mean Ratio N
Self-Report Admin Self/Admin
A. Respondents with Linked Records: Months of AFP Contributions Only
Total 113 90 126% 12,108
By sex
Men 129 103 125% 6,722
Women 94 73 127% 5,386
By age
18–20 12 13 97% 208
21–5 32 27 117% 1,252
26–30 64 51 123% 2,013
31–8 107 84 128% 3,190
39–45 150 114 131% 2,571
45–50 161 129 125% 1,257
51–5 170 141 121% 964
56–60 169 141 120% 653
By education
<Elem 114 82 139% 2,064
<HS 112 83 135% 3,267
HS 110 88 126% 3,725
>HS 117 103 113% 3,052
Mean Self-Report ∗ N Mean Self-Report ∗∗ N
B. All Respondents: Months of Contributions to All Retirement Systems
Total 121 12,128 120 13,397
By sex
Men 137 6,728 136 7,330
Women 101 5,400 100 6,067
By age
18–20 12 213 11 245
21–5 33 1,255 33 1,319
26–30 66 2,016 65 2,057
31–8 112 3,193 111 3,271
39–45 161 2,575 156 2,781
45–50 176 1,259 169 1,459
51–5 185 964 174 1,251
56–60 184 653 166 1,014
By education
<Elem 126 2,065 122 2,629
<HS 120 3,276 118 3,625
HS 117 3,733 117 3,938
>HS 122 3,054 122 3,205
Source: Authors’ computations from the EPS 2002 and administrative records linked with EPS
respondents.
Notes: EPS respondents in 2002 aged 18–60; all results weighted. ∗ = Respondents with a
linked administrative record; ∗∗ = All EPS 02 respondents. Number of months of contribu-
tions counted from the date of the first self-reported contribution to AFP system.
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Figure 2-1. Contribution patterns to the Chilean AFP system by age: self-reported
vs administrative records. (A) Months of contributions to the AFP system, and
(B) months of contribution to all retirement systems. (Source: Authors’ compu-
tations; EPS 2002 respondents aged 18–60 with linked administrative record; all
results weighted; N = 11,305. Note: Number of months of contributions counted
from the date of the first contribution to any AFP.)
retirement systems. Overall, the patterns appear similar to those depicted in
Table 2-5.
For purposes of comparison, Panel B of Table 2-5 provides self-reported
months of contribution data for all retirement systems, including the old
INP, various public sector cajas, and the new AFP system. The first two
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Table 2-6 Pattern of Contribution Months to All Retirement Systems by Sex,
Age, and Education: Labor Market Status at Time of Contribution
Mos. While
Working
Mos. While
Unemployed
Mos. While
NILF
N % of Mos. Contributing
in that LF Status
Working Unempl. NILF Wage
wrkr
By sex
Men 135 0.5 0.7 7,330 78.72 5.44 3.67 89.30
Women 97 0.6 2.2 6,067 81.86 4.00 2.92 90.56
By age
18–20 10 0.1 0.3 245 80.92 1.95 3.86 81.69
21–5 32 0.2 0.4 1,319 82.26 2.79 1.91 86.31
26–30 65 0.2 0.6 2,057 80.89 2.48 1.47 86.87
31–8 110 0.4 1.2 3,271 77.89 3.28 2.40 87.63
39–45 154 0.6 1.4 2,781 79.32 4.68 3.24 89.93
45–50 166 1.0 2.1 1,459 79.87 11.04 5.98 91.65
51–5 171 1.2 1.6 1,251 82.03 7.56 4.55 93.30
56–60 161 0.8 4.1 1,014 82.73 4.70 7.39 93.54
By education
<Elem 119 1.0 1.8 2,629 71.34 5.49 2.41 85.29
<HS 116 0.6 1.4 3,625 76.07 4.59 3.59 88.22
HS 116 0.4 1.2 3,938 84.09 4.30 3.31 91.29
>HS 121 0.3 1.4 3,205 85.96 4.27 2.92 92.26
Source: Authors’ computations from the EPS 2002 and administrative linked data.
Notes: EPS respondents in 2002 aged 18–60; all results weighted. NILF = not in labor force.
Number of months of contributions counted from the date of the first self-reported contri-
bution to the AFP system.
columns focus on respondents with linked records only, while the third
column focuses on all EPS 2002 respondents, whether they had linked
records. Not surprisingly, overall patterns are similar to those previously
described by age, sex, and education. One difference is that self-reported
months of contributions to all systems are higher than those to the AFP
system alone, mainly due to the fact that older (age 40+) workers report
more contribution months. This is probably accurate, inasmuch as the
older workers could have been contributors to the old INP system and we
lack accurate contribution history data from that system.
Table 2-6 breaks down the pattern of workers’ months of contributions
in the retirement system by labor market categories—specifically, working,
unemployed, and not in the labor force. The data reveal that the majority of
contribution months coincides precisely with those months when respon-
dents were working, particularly in the wage labor force. Contribution
patterns (particularly wage employment) are very high during periods of
work. Put differently, lapses in contributions appear associated mainly with
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periods of nonemployment rather than outright nonpayment of retirement
contributions during employed periods. This finding suggests that analysts
concerned with low levels of retirement accumulations would do well to
focus on non- or unemployment. Furthermore, contribution months are
very high for periods of wage work, in the 80–90 percentile range, which
implies that the problems of low contribution months are not concentrated
among the self-employed. Although self-employed persons are not required
to contribute to the system, this does not seem to be a major source of
nonpayment.
Retirement Accumulations in the Chilean Retirement System
Previous research has focused on whether workers are contributing enough
to the Chilean retirement system to obtain adequate benefit levels in
retirement. As a result, analysts have based projected replacement ratios
for AFP participants on the assumption that workers would contribute 70–
90 percent of their work lives (cf. Arenas de Mesa and Gana 2003). The
replacement rate is defined here as the percentage of the worker’s last
pay divided by his or her monthly pension (assuming the partnered retiree
takes a joint-and-survivor benefit). However, in a more recent study, Arenas
de Mesa, Llanés, and Bravo (2005) recomputed projected replacement
ratios using the self-reports of contribution patterns taken from the 2002
EPS. These new findings are important, as they rely on actual patterns of
contributions reported over workers’ lifetimes rather than on assumed con-
tribution patterns on average. In addition, the findings provide evidence at
the individual worker level, allowing the projection of patterns by earnings,
sex, and age. The above-mentioned studies project likely AFP balances at
retirement as well as replacement rates implied by these projections for
a male age-65 retiree with female partner 5 years younger, and a lifetime
contribution pattern of 80 percent of the work life (also known as ‘density
of contributions’), or 60 percent; and a female age-60 retiree with a density
of contributions of 80 percent, or 43 percent.22 A man at age 65 years
who has contributed 80 percent of his work life would be expected to
accumulate an AFP balance of $37 million, which Arenas de Mesa and Gana
(2003) expect would finance a joint-and-survivor annuity amounting to
about 60 percent of pre-retirement pay. A single woman who retires earlier
after the same contribution pattern would accumulate an AFP balance of
$29 million, which implies a replacement ratio of 43 percent. However,
having lower lifetime contributions reduces projections substantially. For
instance, if men contribute only 60 percent of the time and women, 43
percent, estimated AFP balances would be lower by 25–46 percent, and the
pension annuity would drop from 60 to 44 percent for men, and from 43
to 23 percent for women (see Figures 2-2 and 2-3).
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Figure 2-2. Projected accumulations in AFP accounts at retirement age given alter-
native density of contribution assumptions (Source: Arenas de Mesa, Behrman, and
Bravo 2004).
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Figure 2-3. Projected replacement rates under alternative density of contribution
assumptions (Source: Arenas de Mesa, Behrman, and Bravo 2004).
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This chapter does not include new projections of accumulations and
replacement rates using the administrative data, though that is the goal of
future work. However, the information presented in this chapter informs
that analysis by reporting on retirement system assets accumulated by
participants to date. Panel A of Table 2-7, for instance, shows that AFP
account balances reported by respondents who state that they know their
accumulations are accurately measured compared to AFP balances from
administrative records, with the median at around $3 million Chilean pesos
(∼US$5,600). On the other hand, only 40 percent of the EPS respondents
could provide an estimated AFP balance, which might imply that these
individuals are likely to have more assets than those unable to provide
an estimate. Indeed, over the entire EPS sample, the median respondent
offering a balance estimate appears to have four times the accumulation
compared to the median respondent unable to estimate his or her AFP
assets, according to administrative records. Across the entire sample, the
median AFP accumulation derived from administrative records totals about
$1.5 million Chilean pesos (or about US$2,800).
Retirement payments for those currently reaching retirement age also
depend on RBs from the old PAYGO system. Panel B of Table 2-7 shows
that these RBs are worth as much as the AFP system assets for respondents
entitled to them, with the median account worth about $4 million Chilean
pesos (about US$8,000). Clearly, analyses of projected retirement benefits
under the Chilean retirement system must recognize both sources of retire-
ment support. Panel C indicates that AFP accruals for those without an
RB are lower, in part because individuals in this group are much younger
than those who accumulated substantial benefits under the system that was
closed to new entrants in 1980.
Financial Literacy Regarding the Chilean Pension System
What workers know about their old-age benefit system can have a major
impact on how effectively they prepare for retirement and how they deter-
mine their retirement plans. For example, if people believe their benefits
rise with deferred retirement, they may be more likely to respond to incen-
tives to continue work. On the other hand, if they systematically misperceive
the costs and benefits of the system, then their misinformation (e.g. about
the number of years required for eligibility) can shape the system’s popular-
ity as well as the perceived effectiveness of specific reforms. Yet very little is
known about how people develop the necessary level of financial literacy to
understand their pension systems, particularly when workers have personal
DC pension accounts. Studies based on the United States’ experience
suggest that many workers arrive at retirement with little knowledge of
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their retirement system. (See, for instance, Mitchell 1988; Gustman and
Steinmeier 1999; Lusardi and Mitchell 2006.) As a result, they often fail
to plan well for their retirement and may be ineffective advocates for
retirement system changes. Little is known about whether similar problems
arise for workers in a national DC system. As they bear greater responsibility
for their own retirement and pension options through personal accounts,
workers may be better informed about retirement risks and rewards.
This section investigates to what extent Chilean workers understand and
make sense of the pension institutions covering the workforce. We posit
that those better informed about their pensions are more likely to make
sensible provisions for old age, possibly by contributing more, paying more
attention to plan investments, and making appropriate payout options.
Accordingly, we investigate the factors associated with being informed
about the pension system’s characteristics, focusing on, for example, the
association with age, schooling, occupation, sex, birth cohort, and socio-
economic class. Answers to these questions are important for understand-
ing how people perceive their pension system and whether they value
the future benefits it will provide. This issue was important in the recent
national elections in Chile and is a key source of discussion throughout
all the Latin-American nations that have moved toward systems similar to
Chile’s (Gill, Packard, and Yermo 2005). The results of the EPS help iden-
tify which workers can most efficiently understand and maneuver under
such plans, how the plans might be made more effective, and what the
distributional implications of such plans are.
Table 2-8 summarizes the results on knowledge of key aspects of the
Chilean pension system. Across the top of the chart are the data source,
sample, and number of included observations in each cell. Columns (b)
and (c) refer, respectively, to the responses for the 2002 survey, first for
the entire 2002 sample, and second for affiliates. Column (d) refers to
all EPS interviewees in 2004, while columns (e)–(g) break the total down
into the panel subset, new entrants (affiliates) to the pension system, and
nonaffiliates.
Row A in Table 2-8 reports respondents’ answers to whether they received
a statement from the AFP system (the quarterly cartola, which reports past
contributions and projects future benefit amounts). It must be noted that
the questions differed slightly across the two years: 2002 respondents were
asked whether they had received their AFP quarterly report, whereas 2004
respondents were asked whether they had received an AFP cartola in the
past twelve months. In either case, the results are comparable. In 2002
60 percent of respondents said they received the statement, whereas in 2004
the fraction was 69 percent, with a similar change for the subset of panel
members. Three-quarters of new affiliates, who are likely to be younger
than the average respondent, affirmed they received it.
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Whether the effort to provide pension information translates into useful
knowledge about the pension system is quite another matter. Row B.1 of
Table 2-8 shows whether respondents knew the contribution (or payroll
tax) rates required for AFP accounts. Row B.2 then indicates whether
the responses are correct. In 2002 slightly more than half (53%) of the
respondents claimed that they knew the payroll tax rate, but just over one-
quarter (28%) were correct. In 2004 fewer of the panel members (46%)
claimed to know the rate, though more (34%) got the tax rate correct. Not
surprisingly, new affiliates are less well informed, and nonaffiliates know
little to nothing about required contributions.
Another topic of recent policy interest has to do with the commissions
charged by the AFPs. If AFP participants pay little attention to investment
costs, it is likely that AFPs will not need to compete among themselves
to drive down prices and enhance service (Berstein and Ruiz n.d.; Valdés
Prieto 2005). The results from the EPS analysis show, in Row C, that fewer
than 2 percent of the respondents (panel members as well as new affiliates)
know either the fixed or variable commissions in either year. Only half of
1 percent of all respondents claim to know both the fixed and variable
commissions. The fact that workers and savers know virtually nothing about
the costs of investing their funds suggests that there is much work to be
done to educate Chileans about this key aspect of their retirement system.
Financial information regarding amounts accumulated in workers’
retirement accounts, and how the funds are invested, is reported in rows
D and E. Line D.1 indicates that 45 percent in the 2002 survey claimed to
know their AFP balances, with the fraction thus knowledgeable rising to
over 50 percent 2 years later. Among panel members interviewed in both
waves, 20 percent had more information in the second period than in the
first. It is also of interest that new affiliates are relatively well informed,
with 42 percent saying they knew their balances. Line D.2 indicates how
accurately respondents in 2004 reported their AFP balances compared to
administrative records. Estimated balances are within 20 percent of admin-
istrative amounts for 21 percent of the sample. Overall, it would appear that
Chilean AFP participants are about as informed as their US counterparts in
corporate pensions. For instance, Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) find that
US workers tend to understate their DC assets by about 30 percent, at the
median, as compared to administrative records, and by half in the middle
and upper tiers. Furthermore, the low fraction of those who can offer
accumulation estimates suggests that many workers are not well apprised
of a key retirement asset.
For the first two decades of life of the Chilean AFP system, affiliates could
decide only which AFP they wanted to invest with but could not diversify
their holdings across AFPs, nor could they choose asset allocations. In 2000
the government permitted the AFPs to open a more conservative account
02-Kay-and-Sinha-c02 OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha (Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 48 of 58 September 22, 2007 16:54
48 Alberto Arenas de Mesa et al.
for retirees or those within ten years of legal retirement. In 2002 each fund
administrator was permitted to expand the number of investment offerings
from two to five to allow participants to diversify their asset allocations.
Under this new ‘multifund’ structure, each AFP must offer a so-called Fund
A, which invests 80 percent of the portfolio in equities; Fund E, which
holds 100 percent fixed income; and Funds B–D, which hold intermediate
fractions of equities. Workers may elect to hold up to two funds in a single
AFP at a time.
What Chileans indicate that they know about their pension investments
is summarized in Section E of Table 2-8. Line 1 shows that respondents in
2002 did not know much about their pension investments (10% claimed
to know), but this finding is not surprising given that affiliates had not yet
been granted access to a variety of fund choices. By 2004 almost half of the
respondents claimed that they knew about the multifund setup, though
only one-third said they knew the number of funds, and only about one-
fifth could give the correct number of total funds. Further, in 2004, only
one-third of respondents said they knew which funds they held, but only 16
percent were accurate and only 38 percent were aware of which fund was
the riskiest.
Regarding retirement system payouts, Section F of Table 2-8 breaks the
results into three topic areas. The first part summarizes what people know
regarding the AFP system payouts. The second part reviews what individuals
know about the MPG. The third part illustrates what people know about the
minimum welfare benefits, or PASIS.
Several key questions arise regarding the rules pertaining to eligibility
and access to benefits. For instance, the legal minimum retirement age
refers to the age at which eligible retirees may claim benefits. In 2002
knowledge about the legal retirement age for men and women appeared
widespread—roughly 83–86 percent accurately reported these ages (lines
F1.1–1.2). By 2004 the percentages fell a bit, mainly due to the inclusion
of nonaffiliates in the overall sample, though the percentages for panel
members also showed a decline. Line 1.3 shows that few people responded
that they knew how AFP benefits were calculated, with 14 percent of the
panel in 2002 falling to 11 percent 2 years later. Almost two-thirds of respon-
dents claimed to know the rules for spouse and dependent benefits, but
again the percentages fell between years for the same panel sample. It must
be acknowledged that many are simply unaware of the social insurance
coverage that spouses and children receive when the worker contributes
to the AFP system.
Also of interest is the question of whether respondents know about
requirements for the MPG as well as the benefit level. Some pundits have
suggested that requiring twenty years of contributions for eligibility might
induce workers to drop out of formal sector jobs, and recently some analysts
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have opined that the minimum benefit might need to be raised (Rohter
2006). The EPS research shows (lines F2 in Table 2-8) that very few respon-
dents in 2002 knew the requirements for the minimum pension benefit,
and only a very tiny minority could accurately report the requirements
for the MPG (0.2% or fewer). Regarding financial literacy, there was an
increase in the panel’s awareness of the minimum pension between 2002
and 2004, rising from 22 to 34 percent, but the accuracy of their knowledge
declined.
The final section of Table 2-8 focuses on respondents’ knowledge of
PASIS, which is a means-tested payment to the indigent. Interestingly, about
20 percent of the respondents in both 2002 and 2004 claimed they knew
the eligibility requirements, with no important difference between affili-
ates and nonaffiliates in 2004 (new affiliates knew the least). In addition,
only 3–4 percent of the respondents actually knew the correct eligibility
requirements for these payments. Similarly, a relatively large percentage
(approximately 17%) claimed to know the value of the welfare payment.
However, only about 11 percent accurately stated the value. Those most
likely to need the PASIS benefit—namely, nonaffiliates—were no more
likely to be aware of program eligibility rules than others. However, those
nonaffiliates who did know that there was a welfare pension were better
informed about the benefit level than were others. Nonetheless, the low
level of awareness among the population who are most likely to need the
benefit is striking.
Among retirees, knowledge is generally more accurate than among work-
ers (see Table 2-9). Most people who are retired according to administrative
records also self-report they are retired (84%). Some two-thirds of the
retirees know what kind of pension they are receiving, and about 64 percent
know the benefit amount (with an accuracy of ±20%), though the retired
tend to report smaller benefits than are indicated by the administrative
data. Using the EPS, we can compare respondent questions about payouts
with the administrative records. Comparing those for whom we have both
self-reports and administrative data linkages, and focusing first on those
who say they took the programmed withdrawal payout option, Panel A
indicates that beneficiaries understated the value of their payouts by about
7 percent. That is, at the median, retirees self-reported benefits of only
$69,000 pesos, compared to $74,000 pesos from the administrative records.
For those receiving life annuities, the degree of understatement was even
more substantial, with retirees reporting benefits about 10 percent lower
than actually paid. The degree of understatement was less at the low
end. Panel B shows that retirees who said they knew what type of income
they received generally had lower actual benefits than did those who did
not know. Panel C contains official data that show that, as of December
2005, the Chilean pension system had some 377,000 old-age retirees, of
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Table 2-9 Pensions under the AFP System: Self-report vs Administrative Records
Percentile Self-Report Amt Admin. Amt Diff. Percentage
A. Pensions, AFP System: Self-Report vs Administrative Records a (04 Chilean Pesos)
For Those with Self-Reports and Administrative Records in AFP: Phased Withdrawal
(Median of the Percentile) (N=148)
p25 65,000 60,667 4,333 6.7
p50 69,420 74,175 −4,755 −6.8
p75 70,000 74,883 −4,883 −7.0
For Those with Self-Reports and Administrative Records in AFP: Life Annuity
(Median of the Percentile) (N=604)
p25 70,000 73,454 −3,454 −4.9
p50 85,000 93,041 −8,041 −9.5
p75 130,000 142,361 −12,361 −9.5
For Those with Self-reports and Administrative Records in AFP % N
B. Pensions in the AFP System: Knowledge b
B.1. Know that have a retirement pension 84.4 1,092
Life annuity 92.8 702
Phased withdrawal 72.6 440
Temporary income 95.5 64
Median pension of those that know 78,602
Median pension of those that don’t know 129,430
B.2. Claim knows his/her type of pension 82.0 911
Life annuity 89.4 648
Phased withdrawal 68.1 308
Temporary income 92.4 60
Median pension of those claim know 81,126
Median pension of those claim don’t know 92,256
B.3. Know correctly his/her type of pension 66.0 911
Life annuity 74.9 648
Phased withdrawal 52.1 308
Temporary income 73.2 60
Median pension of those that correctly know 91,085
Median pension of those claim don’t know correctly 110,998
B.4. Know his/her amount of pension (±20%) 63.9 676
Life annuity 68.2 539
Phased withdrawal 57.0 179
Median pension of those that know their amount of pension 91,760
Median pension of those that don’t know their amount of pension 121,013
Source: Authors’ computations from the EPS 2002 and administrative linked data.
aOld-age pension, phased withdrawal, and annuities.
b Panel 2002–4, old-age pension include phased withdrawal and life annuity.
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Table 2-9 (Continued)
Phased
Withdrawal
Life
Annuity
Temporary
Income
C. Number of Benefits in the AFP System: Official Figures
Old Age
1990 16,893 12,689 84
2000 76,710 142,446 6,217
2005 115,236 256,107 5,786
Disability
1990 4,095 2,645 45
2000 12,045 7,840 396
2005 22,496 14,475 1090
Survival
1990 15,176 4,857 19
2000 55,229 38,402 19
2005 71,057 62,507 40
Source: SAFP.
whom almost 70 percent were receiving benefits in the form of a life
annuity.23
Implications and Conclusions
It is fitting that the Chilean pension reform is receiving much attention
as it celebrates its Silver Anniversary. Despite the attention and contin-
ued debate about the system’s impacts, little attention has been paid to
the microeconomic aspects. The EPS is a recently developed longitudinal
survey of about 20,000 individual respondents that has provided valuable
new information for microeconomic analyses of key aspects of the Chilean
pension system. Significantly, strengthening the EPS data are the links
between respondent records and a wide range of historical administrative
files on contribution patterns, benefit payments, and other program fea-
tures. Accordingly, the EPS represents a substantial advance for analysts
interested in important micro questions related to the operation of the
new Chilean retirement system.
To illustrate some of the richness of the new information available, this
chapter presents new analyses regarding three key policy questions:
 Who participates in the Chilean retirement system, and what do lifetime contri-
bution patterns look like? We find that, on average, men report almost 40
percent higher months of AFP contributions than do women, which
is not surprising, given that many women interrupt their labor force
careers to rear children. Men report about one-fifth and women report
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about one-quarter higher months of contributions than indicated in
the administrative records, which suggests that self-reports underesti-
mate the extent of shortfall in coverage for sufficient months to satisfy
the twenty-year minimum contribution requirement for the MPG for
participants in the AFPs, somewhat more so for women. Thus, the
probable extent of dependence on the PASIS is greater than would
be indicated by self-reports. Also not surprising is the positive rela-
tion between reported months of AFP contributions and age, with an
increase on average in reported months of contribution of one-third
of a month for every additional month of age over the prime working
years between the age groups 26–30 and 51–55 years. What is somewhat
surprising is that self-reports do not differ with schooling attainment.
On the other hand, administrative records indicate a positive associa-
tion with schooling attainment, at least for those who have completed
high school or more. It seems, therefore, that self-reports are likely to
overstate somewhat the relative extent to which those with less school-
ing are likely to satisfy the twenty-year minimum contribution require-
ment. Finally, spells of reported noncontributions are strongly associ-
ated with nonemployment, which suggests that to increase coverage,
efforts might best be directed toward reducing these nonemployment
spells.
 What have people accumulated in the Chilean retirement system, and what
benefits may be anticipated? The 2002 EPS shows that reported contri-
butions must take place over a high percentage of an individual’s work
life to have replacement rates of over half. For example, a 65-year-old
man would have to contribute for 80 percent of his work life to have
a replacement rate of 60 percent. When the percentage of the work
life during which an individual makes contributions falls, the replace-
ment rate falls on average by as many or more percentage points. The
findings cited earlier show that the EPS respondents who claimed to
know their AFP accumulations report balances that are close to those
in the administrative records. In contrast, those who did not know their
AFP balances according to the administrative records have much lower
balances on average. The findings also indicate that for respondents
entitled to RBs, such bonds are worth about as much as are their AFP
assets. It is therefore important that assessments of probable financial
position on retirement include the RBs with AFP balances.
 How financially knowledgeable are Chileans about their retirement system?
While about two-thirds of AFP affiliates affirmed that they receive
periodic reports on past contributions and projected future benefits,
much smaller proportions know critical details such as payroll tax
rates and commission rates. That such a small percentage of AFP
contributors know the rates suggests that work is needed to increase
the effective competition among AFP providers. The majority of AFP
02-Kay-and-Sinha-c02 OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha (Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 53 of 58 September 22, 2007 16:54
2 / The Chilean Pension Reform Turns 25 53
plan participants also do not know their AFP balances, details on
the multifund system, or details of the eligibility requirements for
minimum pensions. On the other hand, among those who claimed
to know their AFP balances, they appear better informed about their
accumulations than their US counterparts in corporate pensions, and
the fraction of respondents who claimed to know their AFP balances
increased between 2002 and 2004. It is clear, however, that knowledge
about retirement benefits is far from perfect. Although most people
retired according to administrative records also self-report they are
retired, only two-thirds of the pensioners know what kind of benefit
they receive and 64 percent know the amount of the benefit (give
or take 20%). In other words, it appears that information gaps are
considerable, which necessarily limit the effectiveness of the system.
Ultimately, to have a more resilient pension system, people will need a
better appreciation of exactly what is required for eligibility to each of the
pillars. In addition, greater financial literacy would enhance contribution
and investment patterns. Greater knowledge of commissions and related
matters is also essential in making a more competitive AFP system. Finally,
for the government to make useful budgetary projections, better data are
needed on who is in the system, who is contributing, and who is likely to try
to obtain the MPG or PASIS benefits.
If the system is to survive to its next quarter-century mark and beyond,
then it will have to be politically resilient—a difficult goal to attain if few
Chileans obtain AFP benefits or if replacement ratios prove low. It is likely
that political pressures will grow to raise MPG and PASIS pensions, with
negative fiscal implications. And if people do not accumulate enough, there
will also be pressures to allow phased withdrawals instead of annuitizing the
payoffs—another significant financial risk for the government.
It is essential, of course, at this quarter-century mark, a time of taking
stock of the Chilean pension system, to recognize that the system is still
very young and in transition. Most people retiring now were actually not
covered by the new system over their entire work lives. Rather, today’s
retirees continue to rely more heavily on RBs than on AFP accumulations. It
is still unknown how well future retirees who spend their entire lives under
the system will do. Initial analyses of the EPS data suggest both the value of
further analysis and that there are some concerns that must be addressed
to help the system to become more effective and efficient.
Notes
1 Other Latin-American countries that implemented similar changes to their pen-
sion systems include Peru (1993), Colombia (1994), Argentina (1994), Uruguay
(1996), Bolivia (1997), Mexico (1997), El Salvador (1998), Costa Rica (2001), the
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Dominican Republic (2003), Nicaragua (2004), and Ecuador (2004). Cogan and
Mitchell (2008) discuss prospects for funded individual DC account pensions in the
USA.
2 Many have written on the Chilean pensions system (cf. Cheyre 1988; Iglesias and
Acuña 1991; Baeza and Margozzini 1995; SAFP 1996, 2002). Implementational and
operational aspects have been explored by Diamond (1993), Diamond and Valdés
Prieto (1994), Arenas de Mesa (1997), and Mesa-Lago and Arenas de Mesa (1998).
Fiscal aspects of the reform are the focus of other work (cf. Ortúzar 1988; Marcel
and Arenas de Mesa 1992; Arenas de Mesa 1999b). Arenas de Mesa and Marcel
(1999a) have estimated the financing costs associated with the transition (from the
old PAYGO to the new funded system) and minimum basic pension guarantees.
Yet a common characteristic of these studies and most studies on the Chilean
pension reform is the use of aggregate and macroeconomic information. In fact,
the implications of the pension reform on aspects such as private savings are usually
deduced from simple aggregate correlations of macroeconomic indicators (even
though Chile experienced a significant number of concurrent economic reforms)
or from simulations carried out on general equilibrium models (the pioneering
application in this respect was Arrau 1991). Even when analysts looked at specific
aspects such as the minimum basic pension, they have simulated representative
individuals because they lacked microeconomic data. Accordingly, they did not
consider individual heterogeneities critical for questions of equity (cf. Wagner 1991;
Zurita 1994).
3 This section draws heavily on Arenas de Mesa (2005).
4 This institution also manages the retirement systems of the armed forces (Caja de
Previsión de la Defensa Nacional, or CAPREDENA) and the police force (Dirección
de Previsión de Carabineros de Chile, or DIPRECA).
5 This is a lump sum paid to workers at retirement by the government. The sum is
based on the last twelve monthly contributions before June 1979 and is adjusted by
the proportion of total years under the public system and an annuity factor. The RBs
are expected to cost around 1% of GDP per year for the period 2000–20 (Arenas de
Mesa and Marcel 1999).
6 Mandatory system contributions are capped at a ceiling earnings level of approx-
imately US$1,500 per month; fewer than 5% of AFP contributors earn over that
ceiling.
7 In response to high levels of churning across AFPs, the Superintendency of the
AFP system in 1997 required participants to file paperwork in person at their AFP,
a move that greatly diminished the rate of fund switching.
8 Additional factors influencing pension amounts are the worker’s life expectancy
(derived from age- and sex-specific official life tables) and the worker’s number
of survivors at the time of retirement. Retirees have three withdrawal options:
(a) Retiro Programado, or ‘Programmed Retirement’, which allows a system of
phased withdrawals from the accumulated funds and where the pension amount
is recalculated every year; in this case, the pension is paid by the AFP; (b) a real
lifetime annuity from an insurance company (Renta Vitalicia)—in this case, the
AFP transfers funds to the insurer, which in turn makes monthly payments; and (c)
some mix of phased withdrawals for a determined period and a deferred lifetime
annuity.
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9 The current minimum monthly pension is US$105, while the minimum wage is
about US$150 per month.
10 Early retirement may be permitted if the worker can demonstrate that his or her
early retirement benefit would be at least 110% of the minimum pension benefit
level and 50% of his or her average monthly contributions over the past 10 years
(currently, 60% of pension benefits paid by AFPs are for early retirement).
11 All pension system variables (pension funds, yields, and benefits) are measured
in unidades de fomento (UF), an accounting unit indexed to inflation. That the
pensions are automatically inflation-adjusted solves a longstanding and serious
problem of Chilean social insurance. Unlike regular pensions, however, the min-
imum pension is not indexed against inflation but is instead periodically adjusted
by the government.
12 The AFP system currently covers nearly half as many pensioners as the INP
system, has more beneficiaries than the welfare PASIS pension, and includes three
times as many beneficiaries as the public pension system for the armed forces
(Arenas de Mesa 2004).
13 The 2002 survey was initially called the 2002 Historia Laboral y Seguridad Social
(HLSS) survey, or History of Labor and Social Security. But the follow-up 2004
and 2006 longitudinal surveys are called Encuesta de Previsión Social (EPS), or
Social Protection Surveys. To avoid awkward terminology, in this chapter we refer
to the 2002 data as well as the subsequent rounds of data as EPS, or Social Pro-
tection Surveys. The interested reader is referred to http://www.proteccionsocial.
cl/english/presentacion2002.htm for access to the public use data, codebooks, and
documentation of the survey.
14 Information on the methodology and extent of the survey can be found in
Bravo (2004). Members of the armed forces or police covered by separate gov-
ernment pension systems were excluded, as well as a very small percentage of
the Chilean population residing in inaccessible or sparsely populated areas (e.g.
islands).
15 A number of the questions were adapted from the US Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) with the intention of providing cross-national comparisons.
16 The sample is reweighted using sampling weights, so it represents the national
population.
17 Further rounds of the survey were planned for 2006, 2008, and 2010.
18 The sample size for which we can currently link self-reports and administrative
AFP records for the EPS 2002 is 11,305.
19 The reader should be reminded that as the AFP system has been in place only
since the early 1980s and tabulations run to mid-2002, the maximum possible
number of months in the chart can total only about 260.
20 Data on AFP contributions are available only from 1981. INP contribution pat-
terns may become available in the future but to date these are unavailable for
analysis.
21 Another reason that the self-reports of contribution months are higher is that
the EPS labor history asks for job beginning and end dates. Our calculation assumes
that contributions were made without interruption on each job, which may produce
an overstatement of contributions if layoffs or other interruptions occurred but are
not accounted for in the reported beginning and end dates.
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22 That analysis assumes that workers’ initial taxable earnings were CP$200,000
(below twice the current minimum wage); that real earnings would grow at 2%
per year to 50 years of age; that pension investments would earn 4% real per year;
and that the worker would pay fixed monthly commissions of CP$500.
23 This data confirms recent findings by James, Martinez, and Iglesias (2006) on
payouts under the Chilean pension system.
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